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1 Introduction
The composition of the labor force di¤ers widely across employers. Twomain lines of reasoning
have been followed to explain that pattern: taste-based or quality-sorting recruitment. In the
rst case, preferences by employers (or co-workers or customers) will lead an employer into
recruiting particular types of workers, but not others. Becker (1971) has set the stage for this
analysis, under the heading discrimination in the labor market. The other line of reasoning
distinguishes workers by their quality or productivity, to stress sorting e¤ects, according to
which similar workers will be matched together in rms, if their skills are complements in the
production process. A good version of this type of models is presented in Kremer (1993) and
Kremer and Maskin (1996). Both theories predict that workers with di¤erent attributes will
be segregated into di¤erent workplaces.
Employment segregation will be a source of wage di¤erentials between groups of workers
to the extent that di¤erent rms pay di¤erent wages. The two theories mentioned diverge,
however, on the implications of segregation for wage setting. Nevertheless, gender segregation
along occupation or industry lines has been subject to wider scrutiny than gender segregation
among establishments. Studies evaluating the impact of the degree of femaleness of the
establishment on wages have in general found that inter-establishment gender segregation
accounts for a substantial share of the wage gap (see Carrington and Troske (1995, 1998),
Yoon et al (2003), Reilly andWirjanto (1999), Groshen (1991), Pfe¤er and Davis-Blake (1987)
and, for earlier awareness on this pattern, McNulty (1967) and Buckley (1971)).
This paper aims at quantifying the trend in worker segregation across establishments and
its impact on wages in Portugal over a fteen year period. We concentrate on the gender
dimension, to answer the questions: What is the level of gender segregation across establish-
ments in the Portuguese labor market and how has it evolved over time? What is the impact
of segregation on wages? Is that impact di¤erent for men and women? The aim is also to
contribute to a better understanding of the Portuguese gender wage gap, which revealed a
hump-shaped pattern from 1985 to 1999, reaching a peak in 1991.
The study relies on a large linked employer-employee data set gathered by the Ministry
of Employment, based on an inquiry that every rm with wage-earners is legally obliged to
ll in. Each year, an average of two million workers, 200 thousand establishments, and 150
thousand rms are covered.
We evaluate worker segregation across establishments as departures from the segregation
that would prevail if workers were randomly assigned to establishments, instead of departures
from perfect integration, if groups were proportionately represented in each establishment.
In fact, Carrington and Troske (1997) have proven that, in particular in the presence of
small units, di¤erent groups of workers will never be evenly distributed across establishments,
even if the allocation is determined on a random basis. We therefore compute random and
systematic segregation, using both the Gini and the dissimilarity indices. The impact of the
degree of femaleness of the establishment on wages will be quantied using the Oaxaca and
Cotton-Neumark procedures for wage decomposition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 provides
information on the Portuguese labor market and describes trends in female employment.
Section 4 analyzes systematic gender segregation across establishments, and section 5 discusses
the impact of gender segregation on wages. Concluding comments are presented in section
6.
1
2 Data set
The data used, Quadros de Pessoal, are gathered annually by the Ministry of Employment,
based on an inquiry to every rm with wage-earners, which reports information on the rm,
the establishment and all of its workforce. Given the legally binding nature of the inquiry,
the response rate is extremely high. The fact that the information (namely on wages) is
provided by the employer and the legal request for the data to be permanently displayed in a
public space in the establishment, contribute to their reliability, reducing measurement errors.
Reported data include the workers gender, age, skill, occupation, schooling, tenure, earnings
and duration of work, and the establishments and the rms location, industry, and size.
The full coverage of the workforce within establishments is a clear advantage of this data
set for the study of worker segregation across establishments. Also, the data are very rep-
resentative, being in fact a census of the establishments employing paid labor. A wide set
of variables is reported for each worker, but nevertheless less rich information is provided on
establishments.
Establishments in manufacturing and the services have been kept for analysis. Only wage-
earners aged 16 to 65 were considered. Note that a minimum establishment size requirement
had to be imposed for the analysis of the homogeneity of the workforce within rms. Indeed,
it would be meaningless to compute segregation for an establishment with one worker or a
similarly tiny dimension. During the period under analysis, the legislation in the country de-
ned a micro-rm as one employing less than 5 workers. We have considered that benchmark,
and throughout the paper the analysis is restricted to establishments with at least 5 workers.
Therefore, large and small rms  which may be di¤erent in terms of work organization and
labor exibility, for example  are included in the analysis, and just tiny ones have been
dropped.
These criteria led to a data set of 1.4 million workers and 62 thousand establishments
on average each year. A high proportion of the establishments in the Portuguese economy
has less than 5 wage-earners, but nevertheless they employ a very small proportion of the
workforce. Indeed, 90 percent of the wage-earners in the selected industries and age bracket
is kept for analysis, even though just 40 percent of the establishments employing them fulll
the size requirement.1
3 The Portuguese labor market and trends in female employment
Interest in the Portuguese labor market has widened over the last two decades, mainly driven
by its good performance after mid-1980s, when compared to other Western economies. For
example, the unemployment rate declined from 9 percent in 1985 to 4 percent in 2000. The
economy has been under a process of modernization and restructuring, mainly after joining
the European Union in 1986.
As a consequence of this process of change, demand for skilled workers increased and overall
wage inequality widened, as wages at the top of the distribution grew faster than those at
the lower end (Cardoso, 1998). This has been associated with rising returns to education
and job requirements, and is consistent with the skill-biased technological change hypothesis
(see Hartog et al, 2001). In addition, wage di¤erentials associated namely with rm size and
industry a¢ liation are substantial when compared with other European countries (see for
1We have also considered establishments employing at least 3 workers, and performed the
computation of the overall segregation index. The level of total segregation is slightly higher
once those establishments are included in the analysis, whereas its trend is remarkably similar
to the one that will be reported in section 4.
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instance Hartog et al, 2000). In particular, the size of inter-industry wage dispersion is high,
comparable to countries normally rated as having a decentralized wage setting system, such
as the USA or Canada.
These large wage di¤erences for apparently equally-skilled workers indicate exibility to
exploit industry or rm and establishment specic conditions, which may be related to par-
ticular circumstances regarding industrial relations. Indeed, high wage exibility has been
pointed out as a particular feature of this market (OECD, 1994), and studies at the micro
level have shown that rms have considerable degree of freedom when manipulating wages,
despite widespread collective bargaining (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005).
In addition, it is well-known that wages are in Portugal low compared to other Western
economies. These lower wages reect lower productivity of labor, which itself may indicate
reduced levels of physical and human capital (see Branco and Mello, 1992).
Female participation in the labor market is high when compared to other Southern Eu-
ropean countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, and above the European Union average.
Female employment has been steadily increasing in the Portuguese economy. Whereas it ac-
counted for 32 percent of total employment in manufacturing and the services in 1985, by
1999 it had risen to 43 percent. The composition of female employment underwent changes
as well. The share of employed women holding a University diploma increased during that
period from 3 percent to 9 percent, while the share holding a High-School diploma increased
from 11 percent to 19 percent. Changes in the composition of male employment have been
slower, as the share of employed males holding a University diploma increased from 4 percent
to 7 percent, and the share holding a High-School diploma increased from 11 percent to 16
percent. These values illustrate clearly the low level of educational attainment of the working
population in Portugal.
Raw data points to a certain degree of gender segregation at the establishment level (see
tables 4 and 5 in appendix). While in the sample of females the average share of women in
the establishment is 56 percent to 65 percent, in the sample of males the values range from
20 percent to 25 percent  females tend to have predominantly female co-workers, and males
tend to have predominantly male co-workers.
Economic growth and increasing integration of women into the labor market did not lead
in Portugal to a systematic decline in the gender pay gap. In fact, the gap measured as the
di¤erence between the mean values of log-wages in each group increased from 1985 to 1991,
declining afterwards. Furthermore, empirical evidence has shown that even after control-
ling for several worker and employer attributes, the Portuguese wage gap is signicant and
persistent (Kiker and Santos (1991), Vieira (1999)).
4 Gender segregation at the establishment level: systematic and random com-
ponents
To evaluate total segregation in the labor force, the Gini and the Duncan dissimilarity indices,
respectively G and D, have been used.
D =
TX
i=1
1
2
jwi  mij (1)
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where wi and mi are the establishment is share of female and male employees in the sample,
respectively, and T is the number of establishments in the sample.
G = 1 
TX
i=1
wi
 
mi + 2
TX
j=i+1
mj
!
(2)
with the calculation being performed in the data sorted by wi=mi. Both indices are bounded
between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to maximum evenness (perfect integration), and 1 to
maximum unevenness.
In intuitive terms, the value of the Duncan index indicates the share of men (or women)
that would have to move to eliminate inter-rm segregation (see Carrington and Troske, 1995:
517). Thinking in terms of segregation curves, the Gini index is equal to two times the area
between the diagonal line and the segregation curve, while the dissimilarity index is equal to
the maximum vertical distance between the diagonal and the segregation curve" (Hutchens,
2001: 17). For a more extensive discussion of the interpretation of the indices, see Flückiger
and Silber (1999: 53-62).
Hutchens (2001) provides a thorough discussion of the properties of segregation indices.
Out of seven desirable properties highlighted, the Gini index fails to meet additive decompos-
ability (i.e. if we partition the population into mutually exclusive groups, the total Gini index
cannot be exactly decomposed into the between-groups plus the within-groups components),
whereas the dissimilarity index fails to meet the property relating to the movement of individ-
uals between groups (for example, if women were shifted from a group with lower proportion
of women to one with higher proportion of women, the dissimilarity index could nevertheless
decrease). Hutchens himself does not attach much relevance to the problem of the Gini index,
acknowledging that this is a useful measure. That is particularly so in our case, since we are
not interested in knowing the contribution of a subset of establishments to total segregation.
By verifying the remaining six properties, the Gini index allows for the ordering, in a credible
way, of di¤erent distributions in terms of their level of segregation. The problem with the
dissimilarity index is potentially more serious. However, that index has been extensively used
in the previous literature (see for example Carrington and Troske (1995, 1997, 1998), or Yoon
et al (2003)) and, if we want to have benchmark results to compare with ours, we are bound
to use the same type of segregation indices. Or, as Hutchens acknowledges, the dissimilarity
index and the Gini index dominate the empirical literature" (Hutchens, 2001: 17) and we
have therefore chosen to use them.
Segregation will never reach the value 0, in particular if the economy is made up of small
units, even if workers are randomly allocated to establishments. The example in Carrington
and Troske (1998: 450-451) helps clarify this point: in an economy made up of a large number
of two-worker establishments, whose labor force is assigned randomly from a population with
an equal number of men and women, one would end up with one quarter of the establishments
with two men, one quarter with two women, and half with one man and one woman. This
would imply a Gini segregation index of 0:75, and a Dissimilarity index of 0:5. A generalization
of this result for di¤erent proportions of females in the labor force and di¤erent classes of
establishment size is provided in Carrington and Troske (1998: 451) (1997: 403-404), showing
that random allocation generates positive segregation as measured by traditional indices, and
that reported segregation increases when the sample is made up of smaller establishments,
therefore rendering comparisons across samples non-trivial.
One should therefore quantify the degree of systematic segregation existing in the sample
evaluated as departures from random segregation (the one that would result from pure chance
in the allocation of workers to establishments), instead of departures from absolute evenness.
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This idea was discussed and applied in Boisso et al (1994), as well as in Carrington and Troske
(1997, 1998).
To compute random segregation, we consider the original number of females and males
and the original establishment sizes in the sample. Then, workers are randomly reallocated
to establishments and the segregation indices are computed.2 After a certain number of repli-
cations of this procedure, the average segregation index reached is the random segregation.
To obtain the standard errors of the indices (total, random and systematic), we use the boot-
strap technique applied to segregation measurement as explained in Boisso et al (1994) and
later also applied by Carrington and Troske (1998). In our computations the bootstrap is
based on 100 samples of 10 percent drawn from the original data.3
The systematic Gini segregation coe¢ cient is computed as follows (Carrington and Troske,
1997):
G^ =

G G
1 G if G  G
G G
G if G < G
 , (3)
where G^ 2 [ 1; 1]. If actual segregation exceeds random segregation (G > G), then G^
quanties excess segregation over that dictated by chance, expressed in percentage of the
maximum segregation that could occur (1 G). When G < G, we face a situation in which
there is excess evenness (Carrington and Troske, 1997: 406) in the distribution of gender across
establishments, that is, not even random allocation would be able to obtain that balance in
the distribution of individuals. As this index assesses random deviation, its interpretation is
not based on the quota of minorities nor on the size of the units. However, as the size of units
increases, the modied segregation index, G^, tends toward the value of the original index, G.
The same procedure applies to the dissimilarity index.
Gender segregation across establishments in the Portuguese labor market is high and has
been relatively stable between 1985 and 1999 (see table 1). We observe a slight increase in the
random segregation, which can be explained by the change in the dimension of establishments4
and in the female participation in the labor market.
Systematic segregation, when measured by the Gini coe¢ cient, has been stable around 0.67
during this period. The Dissimilarity index reveals as well stability, around the value 0.49.
This means that approximately 49 percent of women or men would have to switch employer
to come to an equal (random) distribution of gender across establishments. This suggests a
high level of segregation when compared to the USA manufacturing, since Carrington and
Troske (1998) have reported values of 0.33 and 0.45, respectively for the dissimilarity and the
2We use the uniform distribution to generate random numbers that sort workers, before
they are matched to the original array of employers (keeping the original number of positions
available in each employer). Using a random number generator, we guarantee that the real-
location does not follow a systematic pattern. The procedure used also guarantees that the
data set has exactly the original structure (establishment size and gender composition of the
workforce).
3We have repeated the procedure drawing 200 or 50 samples, and results remained roughly
unchanged. We have also checked whether dealing with a sample of the workforce, as most
authors are constrained to do, instead of the full population, would inuence the results. Also
in this case, results change very little. The full set of results is available from the authors
upon request.
4The average establishment size in the population under study decreased from 28 to 20
workers over the period.
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Total Segregation Random Segregation Systematic Segregation
dissimilarity Gini dissimilarity Gini dissimilarity Gini
1985 0.553 (0.016) 0.732 (0.016) 0.121 (0.005) 0.190 (0.007) 0.492 (0.017) 0.670 (0.019)
1987 0.552 (0.016) 0.737 (0.014) 0.123 (0.005) 0.193 (0.006) 0.489 (0.018) 0.674 (0.016)
1989 0.556 (0.016) 0.739 (0.012) 0.126 (0.004) 0.197 (0.006) 0.491 (0.017) 0.674 (0.014)
1991 0.553 (0.014) 0.736 (0.011) 0.129 (0.004) 0.200 (0.005) 0.487 (0.015) 0.670 (0.014)
1993 0.548 (0.012) 0.733 (0.012) 0.135 (0.004) 0.210 (0.005) 0.478 (0.012) 0.662 (0.014)
1995 0.559 (0.012) 0.741 (0.009) 0.138 (0.006) 0.214 (0.005) 0.488 (0.012) 0.670 (0.011)
1997 0.564 (0.009) 0.744 (0.010) 0.141 (0.004) 0.218 (0.005) 0.493 (0.010) 0.672 (0.013)
1999 0.563 (0.009) 0.742 (0.007) 0.144 (0.004) 0.223 (0.006) 0.489 (0.010) 0.668 (0.009)
Table 1: Gender segregation at the establishment level. Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985 to 1999).
Gini index. The values for Portugal are however remarkably in line with those presented for
Korea by Yoon et al (2003), with an industry coverage similar to ours.
5 The impact of gender segregation on wages
To analyze the impact of gender segregation at the establishment level on wages, consider
regressions of the type:
Wgi = gXgi + gi (4)
where subscript g = (m; f) indicates the gender, Wgi is the log hourly wage of worker i, Xgi
denotes a set of individual and job related characteristics, which includes the proportion of
females in the establishment; g denotes the regression coe¢ cients and gi is a random error
term assumed to satisfy the usual properties. Hourly wages were computed as monthly wages
divided by the number of hours worked. Tables 4 and 5 in appendix list all the variables
included and their descriptive statistics.
From OLS estimation of equations (4) it follows that:
Wm   Wf = ( Xm   Xf )^m + (^m   ^f ) Xf (5)
which is the Oaxaca (1973) male-based decomposition. The rst term on the right hand
side indicates the portion of the wage gap attributable to di¤erences between sexes in the
mean values of productive and job related characteristics (i.e. di¤erences in endowments); the
second term represents the portion attributable to di¤erences in prices of those characteristics
(often referred to as wage discrimination). The idea of the rst term is to value the di¤erence
in endowments at the wage rate that would prevail in the economy in the absence of wage
discrimination (the non-discriminatory wage structure, following the reasoning by Becker
(1971)). Oaxaca suggested using alternatively male or female wages as that reference wage
distribution, to dene a range within which the values of the components would fall.
Cotton (1988) and Neumark (1988) choose instead the computation of a specic point
within that range, by considering the non-discriminatory wage structure (^

) as the weighted
average of the female and male wage structures, with weights equal to their employment
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shares. The wage decomposition would therefore be dened as follows:
Wm   Wf = ( Xm   Xf )^ + (^m   ^

) Xm + (^
   ^f ) Xf (6)
Di¤ering from Oaxacas proposal, the last two terms measure the male advantage and the
female disadvantage in coe¢ cients (i.e. the extent to which the returns to productive and
other characteristics di¤er from the non-discriminatory returns). These two terms are then
used as measures of the extent of labor market discrimination.
It therefore follows that the contribution of the proportion of female workers at the estab-
lishment level (P) to the gender gap is given, under the Oaxaca method, by
( Pm   Pf )^mP + (^mP   ^fP ) Pf (7)
and by
( Pm   Pf )^ + (^mP   ^

) Pm + (^
   ^fP ) Pf (8)
under the Cotton-Neumark approach.
5.1 Higher concentration of women in the establishment: lower wages for women,
but higher for men
The proportion of females in the establishment workforce has a negative impact on females
wages, with the coe¢ cient being statistically di¤erent from zero in every year. Conversely,
the higher the proportion of females in the establishment, the higher maleswages (except
in 1999) (see tables 6 and 7 in appendix). For example, for males in 1985 an increase of 10
percentage points in the proportion of females in the establishment was associated with an
increase of 0.3 percent in the average wage; this coe¢ cient remained relatively stable over
the sample period, with a slight decrease after 1995. On the other hand, the negative impact
of this variable on female wages increased until early-90s; by 1993, a 10 percentage point
increase in the proportion of females in the establishment was associated with a decline in
average female wages of approximately 1 percent. These results contrast to previous available
evidence that had revealed that the femaleness of the establishment depressed the wages of
both men and women (see Carrington and Troske (1998) or Reilly and Wirjanto (1999)).
We have checked whether these results could be driven by the aggregate occupational
controls used in the regressions. That is not the case, since results are very stable once we
include more detailed controls (two- or three-digit classication of occupations). Moreover,
the results are also invariant to the exclusion of part-timers from the regression.5
Still one other problem might a¤ect the results. Even though the previous literature on this
issue has relied on OLS estimation, the endogeneity of the variable share of females might
bias the results. We have extensively searched for ways to account for the endogeneity of
this variable.6 Omitted variables is the most likely source of bias in our OLS regressions. We
would like to control for rm attributes that may be correlated with the share of females in its
5The full set of results is available from the authors upon request.
6First of all, we have searched for feasible instruments. The share of female in the occupation
or in the region seemed at rst sight natural candidates. However, the share of females in the
occupation has been used in the literature as a direct determinant of individual wages (see
for example Bayard et al, 2003), and the share of females at the regional level can itself be
considered a determinant of the wage level of the worker. We concluded that we were unable
to nd in our dataset feasible instruments for the share of females in the establishment.
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establishments, but data limitations force us to include such variables in the error term. Firms
may select the share of females they hire based on certain variables we are not controlling
for. In particular, we have not controlled for the establishment productivity and it seems
reasonable to assume that there are some unobserved productivity di¤erentials captured in
the error term of the regression that may be correlated with the share of females included in
the equation. For instance, rms with low productivity might tend to employ more female
workers because they t the jobs better, and females might be less productive than males due
for example to job career interruptions. If such a sorting process exists, it would show up in
the regression coe¢ cient of the share of females, since productivity is not controlled for.
We believe however that this selection issue can be tackled if we include a rm-specic
e¤ect in the wage regression. We have thus re-run the wage regressions including a set of rm
dummy variables. These terms are bound to capture the heterogeneity across rms in terms
of, for example, productivity, product market conditions or average labor quality. Controlling
for rm unobservable attributes should, at least partly, account for productivity di¤erences
across establishments.
The results for these estimations are reported in tables 8 and 9. The results for the male
working population using xed-e¤ects are in line with the ones previously obtained. There is
still a positive impact of the share of females in the establishment on male wages. Indeed, from
1985 to 1995 that e¤ect is now much stronger than previously estimated. If the mechanism
of sorting based on productivity described above were indeed at work, we would expect these
results (since, without any kind of control for the rm productivity, the negative covariance
between the share of females and the rm productivity would bias the coe¢ cient on the share
of females downwards7).
For the female working population, results from 1993 onwards using xed-e¤ects are con-
sistent with the ones previously obtained using OLS, i.e. a larger share of females in the
establishment lowers female wages. That e¤ect is now stronger. However, from 1985 to 1991
we nd using xed e¤ects that a larger share of female had a positive impact also on female
wages (as opposed to the previous results using OLS).8
The taste-based wage discrimination and the quality-sorting theories reach di¤erent pre-
dictions regarding wage gaps. According to the sorting theory, the wages of di¤erent groups
of workers within a rm will be positively correlated (see the matching models in Kremer
(1993) and, for a more general model, Kremer and Maskin (1996)). The wage discrimination
theory, on the other hand, allows for the wages of men working with women to be higher than
the wages of other men, to compensate them for the disutilityof having female co-workers.
The evidence that a higher proportion of females in the establishment lowers wages for women
but raises wages for men would therefore lend support to wage discrimination type of models.
However, comparison of the OLS results with the xed-e¤ects results highlights the relevance
of sorting type of theories for the explanation of the pattern and trend of gender wage setting
in Portugal.
Over time, the positive impact of the share of females at the establishment on male wages
declined in Portugal. As the proportion of female workers in the economy increased, the
7With no control for rm productivity, we would have E(b^) = b+ cCov(P;F )
var(P )
, where P stands
for the proportion of females, F is the rm productivity, b is the coe¢ cient on the proportion
of females and c is the coe¢ cient on productivity, if it were observable and had been included
in the regression. Since c > 0 and Cov(P; F ) < 0, the lack of control for productivity biases
b downwards.
8As expected, the coe¢ cient on the size of the establishment is now considerably lower than
before, since most of that e¤ect is absorbed by the rm dummy variable.
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compensation that male workers seem to receive for working with females has declined. This
result points to a fading out of discrimination mechanisms.
5.2 Segregation and the wage gap
We return to the OLS results previously used in the literature (and will comment below on
the results of the xed-e¤ects model). The contribution of the concentration of females at
the establishment level to the gender wage di¤erential is quite signicant, varying from 11
percent in 1985 and 1995 to 25 percent in 1989 (see the last column in table 2).
Method. Oaxaca (1973) Cotton (1988), Neumark (1988)
endow. prices total endow. male adv. fem. dis. total Pf=gap
1985
all var. 0.1108 0.1465 0.2573 0.1112 0.0465 0.0997 0.2574
Pf -0.0108 0.0389 0.0281 -0.0028 0.0044 0.0264 0.0281 10.9
1987
all var. 0.0944 0.1566 0.2510 0.0974 0.0486 0.1049 0.2510
Pf -0.0132 0.0524 0.0391 -0.0021 0.0061 0.0351 0.0391 15.6
1989
all var. 0.0911 0.1787 0.2698 0.0992 0.0544 0.1162 0.2698
Pf -0.0113 0.0789 0.0675 0.0063 0.0099 0.0513 0.0675 25.0
1991
all var. 0.0952 0.1942 0.2894 0.1054 0.0617 0.1224 0.2894
Pf -0.017 0.0838 0.0668 0.0027 0.0114 0.0528 0.0668 23.1
1993
all var. 0.0911 0.1958 0.2869 0.1012 0.0643 0.1214 0.2869
Pf -0.0102 0.0782 0.0681 0.0085 0.0110 0.0485 0.0681 23.7
1995
all var. 0.1013 0.1630 0.2644 0.1046 0.0612 0.0985 0.2644
Pf -0.0137 0.0397 0.0260 -0.0038 0.0059 0.0240 0.0260 9.9
1997
all var. 0.0943 0.1615 0.2558 0.0986 0.0619 0.0953 0.2558
Pf -0.0059 0.0479 0.0420 0.0064 0.0073 0.0283 0.0420 16.4
1999
all var. 0.0944 0.1641 0.2585 0.0990 0.0637 0.0958 0.2585
Pf 0.0051 0.0542 0.0593 0.0192 0.0085 0.0316 0.0593 23.0
Table 2: Male/female log-wage decompositions. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985
to 1999).
The role of prices has been prominent (see table 2). The Oaxaca methodology using
male wages as the benchmark indicates that, concerning the proportion of females at the
establishment level, the contribution of the endowment component is negative (except in
1999). In fact, given that the share of females has a positive impact on males wages (the
reference wage distribution considered) and that women on average work in establishments
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with a higher proportion of females, the endowment component would raise female wages,
reducing the gender wage gap. However, this is o¤set by the e¤ect of di¤erences in prices
(i.e. coe¢ cients) associated with the femaleness of the establishment (precisely because they
are positive for men and negative for women, as previously reported). This price component
accounts for 15 percent of the observed gap in 1985 and 21 percent in 1999, uctuating during
the period in-between.
Oaxaca (1973) Cotton (1988) and Neumark (1988)
all variables prop. females all variables prop. females
end. prices end. prices end. male ad. fem. dis. end. male ad. fem. dis.
1985 43.1 56.9 -4.2 15.1 43.2 18.1 38.7 -1.1 1.7 10.3
1987 37.6 62.4 -5.3 20.9 38.8 19.4 41.8 -0.8 2.5 14.0
1989 33.8 66.2 -4.2 29.2 36.8 20.2 43.1 2.3 3.7 19.0
1991 32.9 67.1 -5.9 28.9 36.4 21.3 42.3 0.8 3.9 18.4
1993 31.8 68.2 -3.6 27.3 35.3 22.4 42.3 2.9 3.8 17.0
1995 38.3 61.7 -5.2 15.0 39.6 23.4 37.0 -1.4 2.2 9.1
1997 36.9 63.1 -2.3 18.7 38.5 24.2 37.3 2.5 2.8 11.1
1999 36.5 63.5 2.0 21.0 38.3 24.8 36.8 7.4 3.3 12.2
Table 3: Contributions to the observed gender wage gap (%). Source: Computations based on Portugal,
MSST (1985 to 1999).
The decomposition based on the Cotton-Neumark methodology reveals that, for the group
of all the variables, di¤erences in endowments, the male advantage and the female disadvan-
tage contribute positively to the observed gender gap, which is in line with the results of
Gyimah-Brempong et al (1992). The contribution of the female disadvantage is larger than
the contribution of the male advantage.
With respect to the proportion of females in the establishment, most of the observed
gender gap is due to the female disadvantage component, rather than to the male advantage
or to di¤erences in endowments, whose contributions to the gap are fairly low. Indeed,
female underpayment accounts for 10 percent to 19 percent of the gender pay gap, whereas
male overpayment accounts for 2 percent to 4 percent of that gap. This nding is at odds
with the results of Rilley and Wirjanto (1999), who found a negative contribution of the
female disadvantage, suggesting that the impact of the femaleness of the establishment on
the observed gender wage gap operated mainly through maleswage advantage.
We have compared the contribution of the variable share of females to the total wage gap
with the contribution of industries or occupations. The contribution of occupations taken
together or industries taken together to the total gender wage gap is dwarfed by the much
larger contribution of the variable share of females.9
Table 10 in appendix reports the decompositions of the wage gap using xed-e¤ects esti-
mation. Once we account for unobserved heterogeneity across rms, the contribution of the
share of females to the total wage gap is, as expected, substantially lower (1 percent to 15
percent contribution when using xed-e¤ects, instead of 10 percent to 25 percent with OLS).
However, a remarkable rising trend can still be detected, from a 3 percent contribution in
9The share of females accounts for 10 percent to 25 percent of the gap, whereas occupations
account for -2 percent to 8 percent, and industries account for -8 percent to 0 percent; the only
exception is 1985, when the contribution of occupations taken together reaches 19 percent.
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1985 to 15 percent in 1999. The endowments component still exerts an egalitarian impact on
the wage distribution (i.e. a negative contribution to the gender wage gap), showing now a
larger magnitude. Therefore, prices continue to be the major force driving the contribution
of the variable share of females to the gender wage gap.
In synthesis, for the Portuguese case, segregation remained at stable levels from 1985 to
1999, but nevertheless the degree of femaleness of the establishment tended to become more
relevant accounting for wage di¤erences across gender.
The question that would follow is of course what has driven these changes in prices, but
at this stage one can only present some speculative reasoning. During the second half of
the 80s the Portuguese economy grew at a very fast pace. A large share of low-paid females
in an establishment might have resulted in a larger pie to be distributed among males, in
a rent-dissipation argument similar to the one presented by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller
(1996). Economic growth combined with short supply of qualied labor has indeed led until
mid-90s to rising wage dispersion, with the bottom wages growing slowly, when compared to
top wages, which increased very sharply.
An alternative explanation may be derived from Goldin (1990), who analyzed specically
the rising female labor force participation and the gender gap in the USA. On several fronts,
the evidence on Portugal is consistent with Goldins reasoning.10 She shows that recent
entrants to the labor market tend to be older women, with less labor market experience than
the women already in the labor market. The decline in average actual experience would lead
to a decline in average females wages and an increase in the gender gap, particularly if one
controls for potential experience and not for actual experience. In Portugal, the average age of
employed females indeed increased, from 33.6 years in 1985 to 34.9 in 1999. Also, the gender
wage gap, as captured in wage regressions using potential labor market experience, increased
up to the early nineties. Progressing in this reasoning, if the women entering the labor
market tend to work mainly in establishments that were already employing a high proportion
of females, which occurred in Portugal, then segregation would account for an increasing
proportion of the wage gap. Furthermore, potential experience contains more error as older
women and actually less experienced ones join the labor force, such that the increasing role
of segregation would show up as a rising price e¤ect. Evidence on Portugal is also consistent
with this piece of the reasoning. In synthesis, rising participation of females from slightly
older groups may provide several clues to explain the pattern and trends in the gender pay
gap detected in Portugal.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed gender segregation at the establishment level over fteen years in Portu-
gal, and its impact on wages and the gender wage gap. A large employer-employee matched
data set has been used.
Results point to a high level of systematic gender segregation at the establishment level. A
higher proportion of females in the establishment lowers femaleswages and, on the contrary,
it raises maleswages. The latter outcome contrasts with the evidence available for other
countries. Such evidence lends support to wage discrimination type of models. However,
comparison of the results obtained using OLS and including rm-specic xed-e¤ects in the
regressions highlights the relevance of sorting of workers into establishments, based on their
productivity, to the explanation of the pattern and trend in gender wage setting in Portugal.
Similarly, it highlights that discrimination mechanisms are declining over time. The results
10We are grateful to one of the referees for having drawn our attention to this point.
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point to the relevance of taking into account gender segregation of the workforce at the
establishment level when analyzing the gender wage gap and deciding on policy measures.
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Appendix: additional tables
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1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Ln hourly wage 5.2596 5.5933 5.8110 6.1595 6.3603 6.4971 6.5818 6.7216
Proportion of females 0.1997 0.2052 0.2145 0.2228 0.2295 0.2363 0.2404 0.2463
Education 5.5132 5.6484 5.9063 6.1435 6.3539 6.6805 7.0088 7.3542
Experience(*) 26.208 26.127 25.507 25.387 25.294 24.810 24.298 24.204
Experience squared(*) 848.27 840.94 810.48 807.32 801.6 777.17 756.13 753.48
Tenure 10.006 10.1162 9.4890 9.2806 9.1149 8.9454 8.5275 8.4567
Tenure squared 178.10 183.91 175.58 175.83 170.14 165.72 158.41 158.44
Ln establishment size 4.6677 4.5950 4.4681 4.3857 4.2385 4.0938 4.0590 4.0027
Lisbon 0.4251 0.4103 0.4007 0.3997 0.3948 0.3805 0.3798 0.3804
Occupations:
Managers, higher clericals 0.0111 0.0103 0.0113 0.0119 0.0113 0.0311 0.0357 0.0401
Clerical sta¤ 0.0895 0.0883 0.0936 0.0982 0.1007 0.1161 0.1152 0.1269
Commercial sta¤ 0.1357 0.1329 0.1274 0.1248 0.1244 0.1329 0.1248 0.1231
Security and other services 0.0585 0.0588 0.056 0.0568 0.0586 0.0701 0.0715 0.0697
Farmers, agricult. workers 0.0024 0.002 0.0026 0.0023 0.0021 0.0029 0.0035 0.0033
Production workers (group 1) 0.2931 0.2892 0.2861 0.2921 0.2868 0.2933 0.2953 0.2923
Production workers (group 2) 0.1738 0.1718 0.1629 0.1651 0.1603 0.1793 0.1812 0.1759
Production workers (group 3) 0.2118 0.2215 0.2353 0.2201 0.2286 0.1367 0.1363 0.1336
Industries:
Textiles, clothing, footwear 0.0919 0.0949 0.0938 0.0898 0.0848 0.083 0.078 0.0708
Wood, cork 0.0461 0.046 0.0448 0.0408 0.0407 0.0476 0.0465 0.0441
Paper, print, publish. 0.0272 0.0271 0.0266 0.0263 0.0249 0.0251 0.0238 0.023
Chemical products 0.0480 0.0468 0.0438 0.0368 0.0346 0.0285 0.0255 0.0262
Non-metal minerals 0.0430 0.0406 0.0387 0.0398 0.0382 0.0346 0.0325 0.0336
Primary metals 0.0210 0.0203 0.0176 0.0144 0.013 0.0088 0.0081 0.0077
Machinery, equipment 0.1315 0.1239 0.124 0.1176 0.119 0.1075 0.1125 0.1102
Elect., gas, water 0.0214 0.0214 0.0157 0.0181 0.0173 0.0168 0.0161 0.0141
Construction 0.1247 0.1257 0.1363 0.1449 0.1488 0.1574 0.1665 0.1634
Wholesale 0.0903 0.0904 0.0893 0.0924 0.0922 0.0865 0.0835 0.0847
Retail 0.0474 0.0491 0.054 0.0563 0.0592 0.0874 0.0884 0.0902
Rest., cafes, hotels 0.0309 0.0321 0.0332 0.0336 0.0351 0.0399 0.0389 0.0387
Transportation 0.1083 0.1117 0.1014 0.1096 0.106 0.1002 0.0971 0.0982
Banking, insurance 0.0555 0.0541 0.0601 0.0584 0.0601 0.0595 0.0523 0.0484
Services to rms 0.0176 0.0182 0.0219 0.0261 0.0282 0.0045 0.0048 0.0056
Social, personal serv. 0.0440 0.0463 0.0484 0.0480 0.0506 0.0675 0.0832 0.1008
Table 4: Sample mean values (males). Note: (*) Potential experience, computed as age-education-6. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985 to 1999).
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1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Ln hourly wage 5.0022 5.3423 5.5412 5.8701 6.0735 6.2327 6.3260 6.4631
Proportion of females 0.5639 0.5767 0.5956 0.6082 0.6185 0.6341 0.6455 0.6505
Education 5.4763 5.7060 6.0359 6.3121 6.5439 7.0174 7.3776 7.7936
Experience(*) 22.168 22.272 21.626 21.267 21.240 21.278 21.125 21.118
Experience squared(*) 627.35 631.66 603.7 588.88 588.39 592.58 592.64 597.43
Tenure 8.9576 9.0402 8.3458 7.8066 7.5880 7.7406 7.4244 7.2951
Tenure squared 136.07 143.12 135.83 129.95 124.24 127.21 123.15 122.81
Ln establishment size 4.6199 4.5449 4.4241 4.3596 4.2646 4.1835 4.1423 4.1082
Lisbon 0.4018 0.3948 0.3790 0.3733 0.3709 0.3621 0.3588 0.3702
Occupations:
Managers, higher clericals 0.0127 0.0139 0.0166 0.0171 0.0202 0.0305 0.0351 0.0405
Clerical sta¤ 0.0677 0.0704 0.0742 0.0793 0.0814 0.0718 0.0721 0.0814
Commercial sta¤ 0.2124 0.2019 0.1968 0.1894 0.1852 0.2145 0.2067 0.2125
Security and other services 0.0768 0.0817 0.0825 0.0861 0.0967 0.1400 0.1624 0.1713
Farmers, agricult. workers 0.0016 0.0012 0.0023 0.0018 0.0014 0.0016 0.0021 0.0018
Production workers (group 1) 0.2469 0.2506 0.2541 0.2649 0.2512 0.2427 0.2388 0.2219
Production workers (group 2) 0.1249 0.1143 0.0954 0.0812 0.0707 0.0943 0.0797 0.0697
Production workers (group 3) 0.2507 0.2575 0.2681 0.2685 0.2824 0.1886 0.1871 0.1848
Industries:
Textiles, clothing, footwear 0.3288 0.3287 0.3279 0.3210 0.3017 0.2858 0.2633 0.2366
Wood, cork 0.027 0.0248 0.0234 0.0224 0.0222 0.0261 0.0258 0.0252
Paper, print, publish. 0.0216 0.0217 0.02 0.018 0.0172 0.0178 0.0159 0.0157
Chemical products 0.0396 0.0363 0.0318 0.0275 0.0248 0.0198 0.0167 0.0177
Non-metal minerals 0.0248 0.0233 0.0222 0.0245 0.024 0.0238 0.0223 0.0226
Primary metals 0.0049 0.0041 0.0035 0.0028 0.0024 0.0016 0.0014 0.0016
Machinery, equipment 0.0689 0.0657 0.0600 0.0633 0.0627 0.0674 0.0684 0.0716
Elect., gas, water 0.0068 0.0069 0.0045 0.0050 0.0046 0.0042 0.0043 0.0037
Construction 0.0129 0.0117 0.0141 0.0161 0.0162 0.0157 0.0167 0.0171
Wholesale 0.0687 0.0654 0.0643 0.0648 0.0647 0.0594 0.0579 0.0587
Retail 0.0627 0.0651 0.0679 0.0716 0.0785 0.0948 0.1043 0.1118
Rest., cafes, hotels 0.0534 0.0542 0.0563 0.0574 0.063 0.0715 0.0710 0.0684
Transportation 0.0585 0.0582 0.0534 0.0524 0.0489 0.0433 0.0407 0.0388
Banking, insurance 0.0421 0.0402 0.0447 0.0419 0.0436 0.0440 0.0396 0.0398
Services to rms 0.0139 0.0162 0.0210 0.0256 0.0284 0.0046 0.0048 0.0056
Social, personal serv. 0.0916 0.1112 0.1238 0.1275 0.1441 0.1683 0.1984 0.2217
Table 5: Sample mean values (females). Note: (*) Potential experience, computed as age-education-6. Source:
Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985 to 1999).
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1985 1987 1989 1991
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females 0.0296 13.7 0.0356 16.1 0.0297 13.2 0.0441 18.1
Education 0.0506 290.6 0.0552 305.2 0.0623 331.8 0.0656 328.1
Experience 0.0268 197.6 0.0287 204.3 0.0296 207.3 0.0281 182.3
Experience sq./100 -0.0353 -162.0 -0.0374 -165.0 -0.0383 -164.0 -0.0362 -142.6
Tenure/10 0.1036 86.4 0.1047 85.5 0.1033 81.0 0.0982 68.8
Tenure squared/100 -0.0129 -36.3 -0.0122 -33.3 -0.0118 -30.0 -0.0103 -23.3
Ln establishment size 0.0575 245.2 0.0604 250.2 0.0551 216.9 0.0543 188.4
Region: Lisbon 0.0726 98.2 0.0686 89.4 0.0763 93.7 0.0985 109.9
Intercept 4.4763 1010.9 4.7145 1056.4 4.9234 1042.7 5.3015 1066.8
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observ. 862137 860395 889362 885135
Adjusted R2 0.6234 0.6373 0.5995 0.5596
1993 1995 1997 1999
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females 0.0262 10.4 0.0344 14.7 0.0147 6.6 -0.0127 -6.4
Education 0.0682 331.8 0.0474 216.9 0.0456 223.3 0.0459 243.8
Experience 0.0279 172.7 0.0272 176.1 0.0269 182.8 0.0254 193.0
Experience sq./100 -0.0350 -130.6 -0.0363 -141.1 -0.0357 -143.7 -0.0336 -151.5
Tenure/10 0.1015 64.6 0.1052 67.9 0.1304 89.0 0.1420 105.2
Tenure squared/100 -0.0134 -27.3 -0.0125 -25.8 -0.0188 -41.2 -0.0203 -48.1
Ln establishment size 0.0554 185.4 0.0570 191.8 0.0584 212.7 0.0569 215.4
Region: Lisbon 0.1104 116.3 0.1037 112.3 0.0923 102.8 0.0934 112.8
Intercept 5.4926 1058.2 5.9543 1088.1 6.0823 1139.7 6.2650 1220.0
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observ. 868326 859522 923256 947059
Adjusted R2 0.5444 0.6041 0.5951 0.6343
Table 6: Ordinary least squares regressions (males). Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST
(1985 to 1999).
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1985 1987 1989 1991
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females -0.0393 -17.6 -0.0552 -24.3 -0.1027 -45.1 -0.0936 -38.6
Education 0.0475 178.1 0.0564 203.0 0.0610 229.3 0.0662 235.6
Experience 0.0155 81.8 0.0166 87.7 0.0175 99.5 0.0161 89.4
Experience sq./100 -0.0192 -59.6 -0.0199 -61.7 -0.0202 -65.2 -0.0180 -54.8
Tenure/10 0.1209 72.0 0.1213 72.8 0.1186 71.3 0.1169 64.8
Tenure squared/100 -0.0216 -38.8 -0.0199 -35.5 -0.0195 -32.0 -0.0173 -26.2
Ln establishment size 0.0458 138.6 0.0486 147.3 0.0444 133.3 0.0443 126.4
Region: Lisbon 0.0764 70.4 0.0679 62.3 0.0660 61.0 0.0795 69.4
Intercept 4.5373 517.8 4.7177 598.4 4.9534 642.1 5.2926 701.9
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observ. 402523 424697 477440 507748
Adjusted R2 0.6594 0.6498 0.6355 0.5864
1993 1995 1997 1999
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females -0.1003 -38.7 -0.0283 -12.0 -0.0596 -26.8 -0.0960 -50.7
Education 0.0710 246.4 0.0434 170.1 0.0411 177.0 0.0423 213.5
Experience 0.0166 87.2 0.0176 98.3 0.0183 109.6 0.0169 126.2
Experience sq./100 -0.0182 -52.2 -0.0228 -68.3 -0.0243 -78.6 -0.0215 -88.8
Tenure/10 0.1297 63.3 0.1284 67.8 0.1368 79.6 0.1482 105.2
Tenure squared/100 -0.0228 -30.9 -0.0221 -33.5 -0.0236 -39.9 -0.0254 -52.7
Ln establishment size 0.0473 135.3 0.0548 164.7 0.0532 174.7 0.0440 172.4
Region: Lisbon 0.0927 75.8 0.0769 68.4 0.0715 66.8 0.0637 72.5
Intercept 5.4427 675.2 5.8800 756.4 6.0455 834.8 6.2469 931.2
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observ. 524732 562909 634009 675553
Adjusted R2 0.5631 0.6317 0.6118 0.6833
Table 7: Ordinary least squares regressions (females). Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST
(1985 to 1999).
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1985 1987 1989 1991
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females 0.1169 24.2 0.0771 15.5 0.0839 15.7 0.1065 18.3
Education 0.0397 248.6 0.0422 255.9 0.0478 272.4 0.0499 265.8
Experience 0.0229 205.6 0.0243 205.1 0.0264 212.1 0.0257 189.1
Experience sq./100 -0.0300 -176.0 -0.0300 -170.4 -0.0300 -173.3 -0.0300 -152.1
Tenure/10 0.0920 85.4 0.0880 78.5 0.0850 70.1 0.0810 58.8
Tenure squared/100 -0.0100 -26.3 -0.0100 -21.2 -0.0100 -14.5 0.0000 -10.1
Ln establishment size -0.0023 -6.1 0.0012 3.0 -0.0009 -2.0 0.0014 2.9
Region: Lisbon 0.0129 11.8 0.0183 16.1 0.0274 21.4 0.0304 21.3
Intercept 3.9703 3.8010 5.4307 360.7 5.7564 525.7
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes
Observ. 862137 860395 889362 885135
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.800 0.770 0.730
1993 1995 1997 1999
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females 0.0633 10.1 0.0299 5.1 -0.0032 -0.6 0.0095 1.9
Education 0.0523 266.1 0.0350 177.7 0.0342 185.5 0.0350 207.2
Experience 0.0261 181.3 0.0244 177.6 0.0247 191.1 0.0237 208.1
Experience sq./100 -0.0300 -141.0 -0.0300 -143.1 -0.0300 -151.4 -0.0300 -165.1
Tenure/10 0.0850 56.1 0.0930 61.4 0.1120 78.5 0.1170 90.5
Tenure squared/100 -0.0100 -13.4 -0.0100 -20.1 -0.0100 -32.8 -0.0100 -37.8
Ln establishment size 0.0038 7.2 -0.0005 -1.0 0.0021 4.2 0.0048 9.1
Region: Lisbon 0.0339 22.3 0.0417 26.7 0.0383 26.5 0.0350 25.2
Intercept 5.9339 432.8 6.5338 432.8 6.5587 413.3 10.8324 0.0
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes
Observ. 868326 859522 923256 947059
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.760 0.760 0.790
Table 8: Firm fixed-effects regressions (males). Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985
to 1999).
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1985 1987 1989 1991
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females 0.0290 5.1 0.0232 3.8 0.0171 2.6 0.0153 2.2
Education 0.0346 146.9 0.0401 170.7 0.0454 188.3 0.0499 195.6
Experience 0.0116 73.8 0.0128 80.1 0.0143 92.8 0.0136 84.2
Experience sq./100 -0.0100 -56.7 -0.0200 -59.9 -0.0200 -65.1 -0.0200 -54.7
Tenure/10 0.1080 65.1 0.1110 67.1 0.1060 63.6 0.1100 60.6
Tenure squared/100 -0.0200 -32.1 -0.0200 -30.8 -0.0100 -24.5 -0.0100 -23.2
Ln establishment size 0.0040 5.9 0.0090 12.6 0.0048 7.3 0.0121 16.7
Region: Lisbon 0.0241 11.5 0.0277 13.5 0.0254 11.2 0.0335 15.1
Intercept 4.9945 441.8 5.1845 455.0 5.3791 422.9 5.6665 405.7
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes
Observ. 402523 424697 477440 507480
Adjusted R2 0.823 0.810 0.790 0.740
1993 1995 1997 1999
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Proportion of females -0.0058 -0.8 -0.0275 -3.9 -0.0421 -6.7 -0.0545 -10.0
Education 0.0545 206.5 0.0316 132.5 0.0304 138.4 0.0314 171.3
Experience 0.0143 82.4 0.0145 91.2 0.0151 101.5 0.0146 124.6
Experience sq./100 -0.0200 -52.3 -0.0200 -66.1 -0.0200 -75.6 -0.0200 -90.1
Tenure/10 0.1230 59.3 0.1270 66.1 0.1360 76.5 0.1360 96.2
Tenure squared/100 -0.0200 -27.5 -0.0200 -32.0 -0.0200 -38.4 -0.0200 -48.0
Ln establishment size 0.0088 11.4 -0.0011 -1.6 0.0013 1.9 0.0055 8.9
Region: Lisbon 0.0375 16.3 0.0358 15.9 0.0481 23.9 0.0310 19.0
Intercept 5.8422 359.6 6.4273 355.8 6.5458 360.5 6.6773 488.1
Occupation(9 categories) yes yes yes yes
Industry (17 categories) yes yes yes yes
Observ. 524732 562909 634009 675553
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.770 0.750 0.820
Table 9: Firm fixed-effects regressions (females). Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985
to 1999).
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Oaxaca or Cotton-Neumark decomposition (total component)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
OLS 10.9 15.6 25.0 23.1 23.7 9.9 16.4 23.0
xed e¤ects 2.7 1.0 2.9 5.0 6.3 9.3 10.3 14.6
Oaxaca decomposition (endowments component)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
OLS -4.2 -5.3 -4.2 -5.9 -3.6 -5.2 -2.3 2.0
xed e¤ects -16.5 -11.4 -11.9 -14.2 -8.6 -4.5 0.5 -1.5
Oaxaca decomposition (price component)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
OLS 15.1 20.9 29.2 28.9 27.3 15.0 18.7 21.0
xed e¤ects 19.2 12.4 14.7 19.2 14.9 13.8 9.8 16.1
Cotton-Neumark decomposition (endowments component)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
OLS -1.1 -0.8 2.3 0.8 2.9 -1.4 2.5 7.4
xed e¤ects -12.6 -8.8 -8.6 -9.8 -5.1 -1.1 3.0 2.7
Cotton-Neumark decomposition (male advantage component)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
OLS 1.7 2.5 3.7 3.9 3.8 2.2 2.8 3.3
xed e¤ects 2.2 1.5 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.0 1.5 2.5
Cotton-Neumark decomposition (female disadvantage component)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
OLS 10.3 14 19 18.4 17 9.1 11.1 12.2
xed e¤ects 13.1 8.3 9.6 12.2 9.3 8.3 5.8 9.4
Table 10: Contribution of the share of females to the total gender wage gap, under alter-
native estimation methods. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MSST (1985 to 1999).
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